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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
All'ed-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson*
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1 in 1925 to ensure
the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts
involving maritime transactions or interstate commerce. 2 Section 2 of the
FAA states that a written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" will be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 3 Although Congress had the constitutional
power to require the enforcement of all commercial arbitration agreements
"affecting commerce," 4 Congress did not specifically exercise its power to
control interstate commerce5 and did not provide a standard for determining
* 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1996).
2 English courts reacted hostilely toward arbitration agreements because the judges
opposed anything that would deprive them of jurisdiction. See Allied-Bruce Tenninix Cos.,
115 S. Ct. at 838. Early American courts adopted the English hostility and refused to enforce
agreements to arbitrate. See id. As a result, Congress enacted the FAA to "place such
agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts.'" Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (quoting
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
3 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996). Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation in any contract.
Id. Section 1 of the FAA defines commerce as:
"[C]ommerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with
foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State
or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or
foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.
Id.
4 See Allied-Bruce Terntnix, 115 S. Ct. at 839.
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whether a contract evidences a transaction involving commerce. 6 The
absence of such a standard forced courts to develop their own standards for
determining whether a contract involved interstate commerce for purposes
of the FAA. Two tests were created: (1) the "commerce in fact" test and (2)
the "contemplation of the parties" test. After years of watching courts apply
two conflicting standards, the United States Supreme Court, in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,7 decided to adopt the commerce in fact test.
Under the commerce in fact test, the FAA will apply to a contract if
there is any correlation between the transaction in question and interstate
commerce. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
established the commerce in fact test in a case involving an Illinois
partnership that owned property in Texas. 9 The partnership agreement in
Snyder v. Smith stated that "any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this agreement, or to the interpretation, breach or enforcement
thereof" would be settled by arbitration.10 In determining whether the FAA
applied to the agreement, the court reasoned that the language "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" must be construed broadly because
"section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements" 11 and "any questions as to whether an issue is
arbitrable are to be resolved in favor of arbitration."12 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the "involving commerce" requirement suggests that
"Congress intended the FAA to apply to all contracts that it constitutionally
5 See id. at 838. Initially, it was assumed that the FAA represented an exercise of
Congress' Article HI power to "ordain and establish" federal courts. See id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1). In 1967, however, the Supreme Court held that the FAA "is based upon
and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and
over admiralty.'" Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
6 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
7 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
8 See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417-418 (7th Cir. 1984). Other courts have
adopted the Seventh Circuit's formulation of the commerce in fact test. See e.g., Mesa
Operating Ltd. v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1986); Lost
Creek Mun. Util. Dist. v. Travis Indus. Painters, 827 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240 (D.N.J. 1994).
9 See id. at 412.
10Id
.
11 Id. at 417 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
12 Id.
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could regulate" and held that the partnership agreement clearly fell within
the constitutional limitations of Congress' interstate commerce authority.13
In contrast to the commerce in fact test, Judge Lumbard developed the
contemplation of the parties test in his concurring opinion in Metro
Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co. 14 According to
Judge Lumbard, Section 2 of the FAA should apply to a contract only if the
parties contemplated substantial interstate activity at the time they agreed to
the arbitration clause. 15 Evidence regarding the parties' state of mind comes
from examining the terms of the contract, the expectations of the parties and
the performance of the contract. 16
In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the Supreme Court rejected Judge Lumbard's
argument that the FAA does not regulate arbitration provisions in all
contracts "affecting commerce" and rejected the contemplation of the
parties test. 17 In ruling that a termite protection agreement between a
homeowner and the local office of a national pest control company involved
interstate commerce,18 the Court concluded that Congress intended to
exercise its commerce power to the fullest extent and adopted the commerce
in fact test. 19
In 1987, Steven Gwin bought a lifetime Termite Protection Plan (Plan)
from the local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies (Allied-Bruce), a
13 Id. at 418.
14 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961). Many courts have used Judge Lumbard's
contemplation of the parties test. See, e.g., Lacheney v. Porfitkey Int'l., Inc., 818 F. Supp.
922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1993); Acton CATV, Inc. v. Wildwood Partners, Ltd., 508 So. 2d 1274,
1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); University Casework Sys., Inc. v. Bahre, 362 N.E.2d 155,
162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d
127, 130 (Kan. App. 1982); Loche v. Dean witter Reynolds, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1296 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1988); Burke County Public Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E. 2d
816, 822-823 (N.C. 1981).
15 See Metro Industrial, 287 F.2d at 387. Judge Lumbard explained:
The significant question... is not whether, in carrying out the terms of the contract,
the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they entered into it and accepted
the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity. Cogent evidence
regarding their state of mind at the time would be the terms of the contract, and if it, on
its face, evidences interstate traffic... the contract should come within § 2. In addition,
evidence as to how the parties expected the contract to be performed and how it was
performed is relevant to whether substantial interstate activity was contemplated.
Id. (Lumbard, CJ., concurring).
16 See id.17 See Allied-Bruce Tenninix, 115 S. Ct. at 841-842.
1 See id. at 843.
19 See id. at 841.
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franchise of Terminix International Company (Terminix). 20 In the contract
embodying the Plan, Allied-Bruce promised to protect the Gwins' home
"against the attack of subterranean termites," to reinspect periodically, to
provide any future treatment free of charge and to repair any damage caused
by new termite infestations. 21 The contract also included an arbitration
clause, which provided that the "[p]urchaser and Terminix agree that any
controversy or claim between them arising out of any provision of this
agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration."22
In 1991, Steven and Jan Gwin agreed to sell their house to Michael and
Wanda Dobson. The sales contract required the Gwins to provide written
evidence from a licensed pest control company that the company had
performed a visual inspection of the house and had observed no active
infestation of termites or damage from active infestation.23 Allied-Bruce
reinspected the house and issued a report certifying that the property was
free from termite infestation. 24 Relying on this report, the Dobsons closed
the sale and prepared to move into the house. One week later, however, the
couple discovered that the report was false because the house was
"absolutely infested with live termites. " 25
The Dobsons' investigations revealed that just six weeks before
certifying the house as termite-free, Allied-Bruce had attempted to
exterminate "a massive swarm of termites," information that neither the
Gwins nor Allied-Bruce had disclosed. 26 The Dobsons filed tort claims in
Alabama state court against Allied-Bruce, Terminix and the Gwins, alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 27 The Gwins cross-
claimed against Allied-Bruce and Terminix. 28 Allied-Bruce and Terminix
moved to stay the proceedings and to compel the Dobsons and the Gwins to
submit their claims to arbitration pursuant to the contract's arbitration
clause. 29
The Supreme Court of Alabama unanimously upheld the trial court's
denial of the stay.30 After noting that predispute agreements are
20 See Id. at 837.
21 id.
22 Respondents' Brief at 3, Allied-Bruce Terminix (No. 93-1001).
23 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.2d 354, 354 (Ala. 1993)
[hereinafter Dobson].
24 See Respondents' Brief at 4, Allied-Bruce Termnix (No. 93-1001).
25 Id.
26 See id. at 5.
27 See Dobson, 628 So.2d at 355.
28 See id.
29 See Id.
30 See id. at 357.
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unenforceable under Alabama law,3 1 the court reasoned that the FAA
preempts state law and makes the arbitration agreement enforceable only if
the parties "contemplated substantial interstate activity" when they entered
into the contract.32 Applying the contemplation of the parties test, the court
found that the parties "contemplated" a transaction that was primarily local
in nature and not substantially interstate. 33
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the interstate commerce language in Section 2 of the FAA should
be read broadly in order to extend the FAA's reach to the limits of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.34 In a 7-2 decision reversing the
Alabama Supreme Court's ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the
FAA governs all contracts within Congress' interstate commerce power and
that the commerce in fact test is the proper standard for determining
whether a contract involves interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. 35
In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer first set forth the background of
the FAA because Dobson asked the Court to overrule Southland Corp. v.
Kearing.36 After explaining that the basic purpose of the FAA is to
31 See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (1994). Many other states have statutes designed to protect
consumers from waiving their right to a trial without knowing and voluntary consent. See
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-203 (Michie 1995); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7191 (West
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-4-2-1 (West 1996); KAN STAT.
ANN. § 5-401 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 417.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 435.460 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (1995); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-2602 (1995); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-C (MeKinney 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
10-3-2 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-
302 (1996); Tix. Civ. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 1996).
32 See Dobson, 628 So.2d at 355 (citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal
Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lombard, CJ., concurring)).
33 See id. at 356.
34 See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 836.
35 See id. at 841, 843.
36 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Supreme Court in Southland concluded that the FAA
preempts state law and held that state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate
arbitration agreements. See id. at 15-16. In Southland, several franchisees brought suit against
the franchisor for allegedly violating the California Franchise Investment Law. See id. at 4.
Since the franchise agreements contained an arbitration clause, the franchisor moved to stay
the proceedings and compel the franchisees to submit their claims to arbitration pursuant to
the contract's arbitration clause. See id. The Supreme Court of California denied the stay and
refused to compel arbitration because it concluded that the California Franchise Investment
Law provided for judicial interpretation of claims. See id. at 5. In reversing the California
Supreme Court's ruling, the United States Supreme Court held that § 2 of the FAA applies to
state courts as well as federal courts because it decided that Congress would not have wanted
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overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate and making
clear that Congress passed the FAA pursuant to its interstate commerce
power, the Court affirmed its holding in Southland that the FAA preempts
state laws and that state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate
arbitration agreements. 37
Justice Breyer next examined whether the FAA governs all contracts
within Congress' interstate commerce power and whether the commerce in
fact test is the proper standard for determining whether a contract involves
interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. In determining the scope of
the FAA, the Court stated that the words "affecting commerce" normally
signal a congressional intent to exercise its Commerce power and noted that
section 2 of the FAA uses the words "involving commerce." 38 After
examining the statute's language, background and structure, the Court
concluded that the word "involving," like "affecting," signals Congress'
intent to govern all contracts within its interstate commerce power.39
In determining which standard to apply, the Court examined whether
the words "evidencing a transaction" mean only that the transaction must
involve interstate commerce in fact (the commerce in fact test) or whether
state and federal courts to reach different outcomes about the validity of arbitration in similar
cases. See id. at 12-16.
Dobson and the attorneys general of twenty states argued that the FAA should not be
interpreted as governing proceedings in state court. See Respondent's Brief at 9-10, Allied-
Bruce Termirnx (No. 93-1001). They asked the Court to overrule Southland and adopt the
construction of the FAA outlined in the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor in Southland
because they felt that the Southland court was denied the benefit of a full adversarial briefing
and argument on the issue of whether the FAA governs proceedings in state courts. See id. at
10. Since the Southland appellees had stipulated in the lower courts that the FAA applied, the
states were not put on notice that the issue of preemption was before the Court and did not
participate. See id. at 10, 13.
The amici curiae brief of the attorneys general argued that the approach to statutory
interpretation used in Southland has been outmoded by key precedents during the past decade.
See id. at 13. The Southland court held that the FAA preempted state law despite the plain
text of the FAA addressing only "courts of the United States" and "United States district
court[s]," and the admission that "the legislative history is not without its ambiguities." Id. at
14 (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 12). Moreover, the Southland court's core supposition
that "Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts," id. (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 12), cannot survive the
present Court's "clear statement" jurisprudence emphasized subsequent to Southland. See id.
(quoting States' Brief at 8-9, Allied-Bruce Ternmnix (No. 93-1001)).
37 See Allied-Bruce Tenninix, 115 S. Ct. at 839.
38 See id.
3 9 See Id. at 841.
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they mean that the parties must have contemplated interstate activity at the
time of the contract (the contemplation of the parties test).40 The Court
rejected the contemplation of the parties test for three reasons. First, the
contemplation of the parties test would defeat the purpose of the FAA by
inviting litigation about what was, or was not, "contemplated." 41 Second,
the statute's language permits the commerce in fact test and nothing in the
FAA's history suggests any other standard. 42  Third, previous
interpretations43 of the FAA held that state laws contrary to the FAA are
preempted by the FAA.44
The Court also noted that an amicus curiae argued for an "objective"
version of the contemplation of the parties test because such a standard
would better protect consumers asked to sign form contracts by
businesses. 4 5 The Court rejected this version because it was uncertain how
the "objective" version of the contemplation of the parties test would help
consumers.
46 The Court also noted that section 2 gives States a method for
protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an
unwanted arbitration provision.
4 7
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she reluctantly
agreed with the Court's judgment.48 She continued to adhere to the view
4 Respondents urged the Supreme Court to uphold the Alabama Supreme Court by
adopting the contemplation of the parties interpretation. See Respondent's Brief at 15, Allied-
Bruce Terminir (No. 93-1001).
41 Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 841. Justice Breyer asked, "Why would
Congress intend a test that risks the very kind of costs and delay through litigation (about the
circumstances of contract formation) that Congress wrote the Act to help the parties avoid?"
Id. Moreover, "that interpretation too often would turn the validity of an arbitration clause on
what, from the perspective of the statute's basic purpose, seems happenstance, namely
whether the parties happened to think to insert a reference to interstate commerce in the
document or happened to mention it in an initial conversation." Id.
42 See id. at 842.
43 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-16 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-492
(1987).
4 4 See Allied-Bruce Tenninix, 115 S. Ct. at 842.
45 See id. at 842-843.
4 6 See id. at 843.
47 See id. Justice Breyer wrote, "States may regulate contracts, including arbitration
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause
'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Id.
48 See id. at 843-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor commented that
"[tihe reading of § 2 adopted today will displace many state statutes carefully calibrated to
protect consumers, ... and state procedural requirements aimed at ensuring knowing and
voluntary consent.. . ." Id.
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that Congress intended the FAA to apply only in federal courts, 49 but she
joined the majority based upon a concern for individuals who had made
contracts in reliance on the Court's previous interpretations5" of the FAA
and the principle of stare decisis. 51 Justice O'Connor concluded that it
remains Congress' task to correct the Court's expansive interpretation of the
FAA's interstate commerce language. 52
Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's holding and stated that
Southland clearly misconstrued the FAA. 53 Although he acknowledged that
he previously joined two judgments that upheld Southland,54 Justice Scalia
distinguished Allied-Bruce because the respondent in this case specifically
asked the Court to overrule Southland.55 Justice Scalia did not believe that a
"proper application of stare decisis" prevented an overruling of Southland
because "[a]dhering to Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction
of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes." 56
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which he questioned
whether overruling Southland would "frustrate the legitimate expectations
of people who have drafted and executed contracts in the belief that even
state courts will strictly enforce arbitration clauses." 57 Justice Thomas
49 See id. at 844. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that she
"continue[s] to believe that Congress never intended the Federal Aribtration Act to apply in
state courts, and that this Court has strayed far afield in giving the Act so broad a compass."
Id.
50 See infra, note 58.
51 See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843-844 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor wrote:
Were we writing on a clean slate, I would adhere to that view and affirm the Alabama
court's decision. But, as the Court points out, more than 10 years have passed since
Southland, several subsequent cases have built upon its reasoning, and parties have
undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the Act in the
interim. After reflection, I am persuaded by considerations of stare decisis, which we
have said "have special force in the area of statutory interpretation," . . . to acquiesce in
today's judgment.
Id. at 844 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
52 See Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53 See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
55 See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 12:1 19961
ALLIED.BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON
argued that the FAA does not apply in state courts5 s and stated that even if
the interstate commerce issue raises uncertainty, the Court should defer to
the "core principles of federalism."
59
In arguing that Judge Lumbard pulled the contemplation of the parties
test "out of thin air," 60 the petitioners noted that "it would be almost
inexplicable for Congress to have wanted the jurisdiction of the Act to
depend in every case upon what the parties subjectively understood about
the extent of interstate commerce involved" 61 and stated that the language
"contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" "says nothing more
than the contract must be evidence of the transaction, not of the 'commerce'
to which it applies." 62 The petitioners further argued that the words
"transaction involving commerce" (like the words "maritime transaction")
are "plainly intended to mark out the jurisdictional bounds of the statute. "63
In determining whether the FAA applied to a contract, "Congress imposed
two related, but distinct requirements: to establish jurisdictional nexus,
there must a 'transaction involving interstate commerce' and, to assure that
the agreement to arbitrate relates to that transaction, there must be a contract
(containing a written agreement to arbitrate) 'evidencing' the transaction. "64
By effectively separating the words "contract evidencing a transaction"
from the words "involving commerce," both the petitioners and the
Supreme Court refuse to acknowledge that the language "a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" is a single unit that needs to
58 See id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5 9 
rd. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 Petitioners' Brief at 24, Allied-Bruce Teminix (No. 93-1001).
61 rd. at 24.
62 Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the petitioners stated that a review of
the history of the phrase "contract evidencing" confirms that Congress did not intend to limit
the exercise of its commerce power. See id. The phrase was absent from an earlier version of
the FAA, which applied broadly to "a written provision in any contract or maritime
transaction or transaction involving commerce." Id. at 15-16 (quoting S. 4214, 67th Cong.
§ 2 (1922); S. 1005, 68th Cong. (1923); H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1924)). "That language ('any
contract'), if read literally, would have made all arbitration provisions enforceable, and, as a
consequence, raised the most serious questions about the source of congressional authority.
The changed language effectively avoided those questions, confining the statute to those fields
within Congress' acknowledged control." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court conceded that this argument "leaves little work for the word
'evidencing' ... to perform, for every contract evidences some transaction." Alied-Bruce
Teminix, 115 S. Ct. at 842. However, the Court speculated that "perhaps Congress did not
want that word to perform much work[.]" Id.
63 Petitioners' Reply Brief at 6-7, Allied-Bruce Temdnix (No. 93-1001).
6 4 1d.
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be considered as a whole.65 The Court's interpretation gives no meaning to
the phrase "contract evidencing" because, by definition, every contract
evidences a transaction. 66 Although the Court speculated that Congress did
not intend to give the phrase "contract evidencing" any meaning, it seems
more logical to conclude that the contract must evidence a particular type of
transaction-a transaction involving commerce. 67 Considering that the law
of contracts attempts to effectuate the parties' understandings as to a
contract's scope and content, the contemplation of the parties test is more
faithful to the statutory text of the FAA because it provides a workable
standard that effectuates the intentions of contracting parties. 6 8 By
examining the terms of the contract, the expectations of the parties and the
performance of the contract, the contemplation of the parties test enforces
arbitration agreements in contracts clearly involving interstate commerce
and protects unsuspecting consumers and other unsophisticated parties from
being bound by the FAA.69
The petitioners' argument that the contemplation of the parties test
"invites a cumbersome inquiry into the subjective understandings of the
parties about the nature of the transaction and any interstate activity likely
associated with it"70 ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court to adopt the
commerce in fact test in the Allied-Bruce Terminix case.71 The Court did not
want to adopt a standard that would create endless litigation about what was
contemplated. 72 This judicial economy has ensured that businesses will
enjoy a faster, less expensive method for disposing of consumer complaints
and that unsuspecting consumers will no longer enjoy the protection of state
statutes precluding the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements.
Jay A. Yurkiw
65 Respondent's Brief at 18, Allied-Bruce Terminix (No. 93-1001).
66 See id. at 19.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 11.
69 See id.
70 Petitioners' Brief at 9-10, Allied-Bruce Terminix (No. 93-1001).
71 See Allied-Bruce Terninix, 115 S. Ct. at 843.
72 See id.
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